THE "CONTROLLING PERSONS" LIABILITY OF
BROKER-DEALERS FOR THEIR EMPLOYEES'
FEDERAL SECURITIES VIOLATIONS
The Securities Act of 19331 and the Securities Exchange Act of

19342 give the investor various expansive civil remedies against deceitful securities underwriters, 3 offerors and sellers.4

Armed with these

broad causes of action, private investors would appear to be wellprotected against the fraudulent acts of securities salesmen. In many
situations, however, an action against the wrongdoing salesman may
be fruitless. Since salesmen usually have only limited financial resources, the injured investor will generally prefer to sue the party with

the "deepest pockets," the party most able to bear the loss. Moreover, when named as defendants in a securities fraud suit, salesmen
often find it convenient to disappear, leaving the plaintiff with, at most,
an unsatisfied default judgment.5 Thus, the defrauded investor almost
1. 15 U.S.C. § 77a-aa (1970).
HEREAFTER THE FOLLOWING CITATIONS WILL BE USED IN THIS
NOTE:
A. BRomEERG, SEcuarrUms Aw: FRAuD-SEC RULE 10b-5 (1973) thereinafter cited
as BRomERG];
Ruder, Multiple Defendants in Securities Law Fraud Cases: Aiding and Abetting,
Conspiracy, In Pari Delicto, Indemnification, and Contribution, 120 U. PA. L. REV.
597 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Ruder].
2. 15 U.S.C. H§ 78a-jj (1970).
3. See section 11 of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1970) (subjecting an underwriter to liability for damages resulting from material misrepresentations or omissions in
registration statements).
The term "underwriter" has been broadly defined to include anyone who directly
or indirectly participates in the distribution of securities from an issuer to the public.
SEC v. Spectrum, Ltd., 489 F.2d 535, 541 n.11 (2d Cir. 1973); SEC v. North Am.
Research & Dev. Corp., 424 F.2d 63, 72 (2d Cir. 1970).
4. See, e.g., section 12(1) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 771(1) (1970) (making any
offeror or seller of securities who violates the registration requirement liable to persons
purchasing such securities from him); § 12(2), 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1970) (making
a person offering or selling securities by the use of false or misleading statements liable
to the purchaser of such securities); § 9(e) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78i(e)
(1970) (providing a cause of action for investors injured by the manipulation of securities listed on a national securities exchange).
In addition to these explicit liability sections, investors have been given an important implied cause of action under section 10(b) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)
(1970), and rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1973) (prohibiting material misstatements or omissions in connection with the purchase or sale of any security). See Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971).
5. See, e.g., Kamen & Co. v. Paul H. Aschkar & Co., 382 F.2d 689 (9th Cir.
1967), cert. dismissed, 393 U.S. 801 (1968); Goodman v. H. Hentz & Co., 265 F.
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invariably prefers to 1iroceed against the salesman's employer: the
brokerage house itself and its partners or officers and directors.'
Although the courts generally have permitted injured investors

to recover from brokerage firms for the federal securities violations
of their salesmen, no uniform or consistent theory has been utilized
to justify such a cause of action. The theories employed range from

the accepted and conventional-liability imposed on a brokerage
house as an "aider and abettor" of an employee's federal securities
violation--to the novel and unique-implied private causes of action
under the "diligent supervision" rules of the New York Stock Exchange [NYSE]8 and the National Association of Securities Dealers,
Supp. 440 (N.D. Il. 1967); Lorenz v. Watson, 258 F. Supp. 724 (E.D. Pa. 1966); cf.
SEC v. First Sec. Co., 463 F.2d 981 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 880 (1972)
(wrongdoing president of brokerage house committed suicide).
6. But see Herring v. Hendison, 218 F. Supp. 419 (S.D.N.Y. 1963), where only
the wrongdoing salesman was successfully sued since the brokerage house had folded
and a default judgment was entered against its owner.
7. See, e.g., SEC v. First Sec. Co., 463 F.2d 981 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 880 (1972); SEC v. Charles A. Morris & Associates, Inc., [1972-1973 Transfer
Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP.
93,756 (W.D. Tenn. 1973); Anderson v. Francis
I. duPont & Co., 291 F. Supp. 705 (D. Minn. 1968). See also Landy v. FDIC, 487
F.2d 139 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 42 U.S.L.W. 3593 (U.S. Apr. 28, 1974) (action
against brokerage house for aiding and abetting embezzling bank president); Brennan
v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 417 F.2d 147 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397
U.S. 989 (1970) (action against corporation for aiding and abetting securities dealer
in fraudulent sales of corporation's stock). See generally 2 BRONMERG §§ 8.5(530)(549).
8. Rule 405 requires every member organization to, inter alia:
(1) Use due diligence to learn the essential facts relative to every customer, every order, every cash or margin account ....
(2) Supervise diligently all accounts handled by registered representatives of the organization.
(3) Specifically approve the opening of an account prior to or promptly
after the completion of any transaction for the account of or with a customer
....
The member, general partner, officer or designated person approving
the opening of the account shall, prior to giving his approval, be personally
informed as to the essential facts relative to the customer and to the nature
of the proposed account . . . . Reprinted in 2 CCH N.Y. STocK ExcH.
GumE 2405 (1970).
The literature on implied actions under the stock exchange rules is extensive. See
generally Allen, Liability Under the Securities Exchange Act for Violations of Stock
Exchange Rules, 25 Bus. Lw. 1493 (1970); Hoblin, A Stock Broker's Implied Liability to Its Customer for Violation of a Rule of a Registered Stock Exchange, 39 FoiwHAM L. REV. 253 (1970); Lowenfels, Implied Liabilities Based upon Stock Exchange
Rules, 66 COLUm. L. lv. 12 (1966); MacLean, Brokers' Liability for Violation of Exchange and NASD Rules, 47 DENVER L.J. 63 (1970); Wolfson & Russo, The Stock
Exchange Member: Liability for Violation of Stock Exchange Rules, 58 CALM. L.
RV. 1120 (1970); Comment, The "Know Your Customer" Rule of the NYSE: Liability of Broker-Dealers Under the UCC and Federal Securities Laws, 1973 DUKE LJ.
489; Note, Private Actions as a Remedy for Violations of Stock Exchange Rules, 83
HARv. L. REV. 825 (1970).
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However, neither of these theories is particularly use-

ful to the injured investor, the former because of difficulties of proof1

°

and the latter because of judicial reluctance to create such a cause
of action. 1 Therefore, most investors who wish to sue a brokerage
9. Section 27 requires each member to:
(a) [E]stablish, maintain and enforce written procedures which will enable it to supervise properly the activities of each registered representative and
associated person ....
(b) [D]esignate a partner, officer or manager in each office . . . to
carry out the written supervisory procedures ....
(c) [R]eview and endorse in writing . . . all transactions and all correspondence of its registered representatives ....
(d) [P]eriodic[ally] examin[e]. . . customer accounts ...
(e) [A]scertain by investigation the good character, business repute,
qualifications and experience of [employees) . . . . Reprinted in NATIONAL
ASSOCrTION OF SEcuRmEs DEALERS, INC., REPRINT OF THE MANUAL
2177
(1973).
The NASD rules, regulating member over-the-counter broker-dealers, are promulgated pursuant to section 15A of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 70o-3(b) to (d) (1970).
See generally Lowenfels, Private Enforcement in the Over-the-Counter Securities Markets: Implied Liability Based on NASD Rules, 51 CORNELL L.Q. 633 (1966); MacLean, supra note 8; Comment, Civil Liability for Violation of NASD Rules: SEC v.
First Securities Co., 121 U. PA. L. Rv. 388 (1972).
10. Traditionally, in order to hold a brokerage firm liable as an aider-abettor a
plaintiff has been required to prove both that the brokerage firm knew an illegal act
was committed and that the firm rendered substantial assistance to the wrongdoer. See
Landy v. FDIC, 486 F.2d 139 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 94 S. Ct. 1979
(1974); Ruder 638-39. There is, however, some indication that the standard of
liability is being lowered. See SEC v. First Sec. Co., 463 F.2d 981 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 880 (1972) (liability predicated on aiding and abetting may be
founded on less than actual knowledge and participation in a lob-5 violation); cf. SEC
v. Spectrum, Ltd., 489 F.2d 535 (2d Cir. 1973) (attorney who negligently rendered an
opinion letter stating that securities could be sold without federal registration held liable
as aider-abettor in an SEC enforcement proceeding).
11. See, e.g., Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache & Co., 358 F.2d 178 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 817 (1966) (no private action under NASD rule requiring members
to observe high standard of commercial honor and just and equitable principles of
trade); Wells v. Blythe & Co., [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
93,759 (N.D. Cal. 1972) (no private action under NASD "suitability" rule, at least
in absence of allegation of fraud); McMaster Hutchinson & Co. v. Rothschild & Co.,
[1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. %93,541 (N.D. Ill. 1972) (no
private action under NYSE "know-your-customer" rule); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v.
Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
%92,748 (N.D. 111.1970) (no private cause of action under NYSE Rule 405); Mercury Inv. Co. v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, 295 F. Supp. 1160 (S.D. Tex. 1969) (no private action under NASD "suitability" rule); cf. Landy v. FDIC, 486 F.2d 139 (3d
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 94 S. Ct. 1979 (1974) (refusing to recognize an implied private right of action based on stock exchange rules where the plaintiff had not
met his burden of proving that the implication was necessary). But see SEC
v. First Sec. Co., 463 F.2d 981, 988 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 880 (1972) (upholding private action under NASD diligent supervision rule); Avern Trust v. Clarke,
415 F.2d 1238 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 963 (1970) (upholding private
cause of action under NASD "suitability" rule) (dictum); Buttrey v. Merrill Lynch,
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firm under the securities acts rely on two other theories of liability:
agency or "respondeat superior,"' 12 and the "controlling persons" liability provided by the federal statutes themselves. 13 The distinction be-

tween these two theories is particularly important because of the differing defenses each affords.'

4

Yet recent cases indicate marked judi-

cial confusion over which theory sets the appropriate and "correct"
standard of liability.
This Note will analyze the "respondeat superior" and "control-

ling persons" theories of brokerage firm liability. In so doing, it will
suggest that the controlling persons statutes have excluded the application of common law agency principles in suits under the federal
securities laws. 15 The Note will then discuss the statutory defenses
of the controlling persons provisions and will conclude that, although
negligence is probably sufficient for brokerage firm liability under the
the 1933 Act, recklessness should be required to impose liability under
the 1934 Act.
AGENCY AND CONTROLLING PERSONS LIABILITY: A COMPARISON
A

This section of the Note will compare the two most frequently
used theories under which brokerage firms have been held liable for
their salesmen's violations of the federal securities laws. The first
theory derives from the familiar common law doctrine which makes a
principal liable for misrepresentations made by an agent within the
scope of the agent's actual or apparent authority.' 6 The second is
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 410 F.2d 135 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 838
(1969) (upholding private cause of action for violation of the "know-your-customer"
requirement of NYSE Rule 405); Stevens v. Abbott, Proctor & Paine, 288 F. Supp. 836,
846-47 (E.D. Va. 1968) (upholding private cause of action under both NASD and
NYSE diligent supervision rules).
12. See cases cited in note 16 infra.
13. See cases cited in note 20 infra.
14. See text accompanying notes 28-44 infra.
15. For a contrary view, see Note, The Burden of Control: Derivative Liability Under Section 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act, 48 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1019, 1033, 1041
(1973), which concludes that it would be "inconceivable" that section 20(a) was intended to limit existing respondeat superior liability. Id. at 1041. However, since the
exclusivity principle would apply only to federal causes of action which did not exist
under the general law, the continued viability of causes based on common law deceit
or fraud would be in no way affected by the adoption of this principle. For a discussion
of the elements of this common law tort, with specific reference to the securities law
context, see 3 L. Loss, SEcumrrEs REGULATION 1431-35 (2d ed. 1961). See text accompanying note 69 infra.
16. The RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF AGENCY § 257 (1958) provides:
A principal is subject to liability for loss caused to another by the other's reliance upon a tortious representation of a servant or other agent, if the representation is:
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provided by the
express controlling persons sections of both federal
7
securities acts..
Section 20(a) of the 1934 Act imposes liability subject to a good
faith defense on "[e]very person who, directly or indirectly, controls
any person liable under" the antifraud provisions of the Act.18 Similarly, section 15 of the 1933 Act imposes liability, subject to a scienter
requirement, on "[e]very person who, by or through stock ownership,
agency, or otherwise

. .

controls any person liable under" the anti-

fraud provisions of the 1933 Act.' These controlling persons sections
have frequently been utilized to impose liability on a brokerage house
for the fraudulent acts of securities salesmen.2"

A number of courts

(a) authorized;
(b) apparently authorized; or
(c) within the power of the agent to make for the principal.
Cases applying this principle in suits under the federal securities laws to hold
broker-dealers liable as principals include Fey v. Walston & Co., 493 F.2d 1036 (7th
Cir. 1974); Lewis v. Walston & Co., 487 F.2d 617 (5th Cir. 1973); SEC v. First See.
Co., 463 F.2d 981 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 880 (1972); Johns Hopkins Univ.
V. Hutton, 422 F.2d 1124 (4th Cir. 1970), aff'g in part and rev'g in part 297 F. Supp.
1165 (D. Md. 1968); Armstrong, Jones & Co. v. SEC, 421 F.2d 359 (6th Cir. 1970);
SEC v. Charles A. Morris & Associates, Inc., [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED.
SEc. L. REP. f 93,756 (W.D. Tenn. 1973).
17. Securities Act of 1933 § 15, 15 U.S.C. § 77o (1970); Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 § 20(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (1970).
18. Section 20(a) provides:
Every person who, directly or indirectly, controls any person liable under
any provision of this chapter or of any rule or regulation thereunder shall also
be liable jointly and severally with and to the same extent as such controlled
person to any person to whom such controlled person is liable, unless the controlling person acted in good faith and did not directly or indirectly induce
the act or acts constituting the violation or cause of action. 15 U.S.C. §
78t(a) (1970).
19. Section 15 provides:
Every person who, by or through stock ownership, agency, or otherwise,
or who, pursuant to or in connection with an agreement or understanding with
one or more persons by or through stock ownership, agency, or otherwise,
controls any person liable under sections 77k or 771 of this title, shall be
liable jointly and severally with and to the same extent as such controlled person to any person to whom such controlled person is liable, unless the controlling person had no knowledge of or reasonable ground to believe in the
existence of the facts by reason of which the liability of the controlled person
is alleged to exist. 15 U.S..C § 77o (1970).
No one has adequately accounted for the differences in wording between the two
sections. Presumably the reference to direct and indirect control in section 20(a) is
merely a shorthand way of saying "by or through stock ownership, agency, or otherwise" as stated in section 15. It is more difficult to explain the difference in the defenses provided, although Loss has suggested that the good faith defense of section
20(a) is an easier defense to make. See 3 L. Loss, SEcurrrFs REGULATION 1747 (2d
ed. 1961).
20. See, e.g., SEC v. First See. Co., 463 F.2d 981 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 880 (1972); Gordon v. Burr, 366 F. Supp. 156 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); SEC v. Lum's,
Inc., 365 F. Supp. 1046 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Anderson v. Francis I. duPont & Co., 291

Vol. 1974:824]

CONTROLLING PERSONS LIABILITY

or the
have not been content to rest their decisions upion one analysis
21
other, and have instead employed both theories of liability.
The choice of theory-agency or controlling persons liabilityis important because, under agency law, the brokerage firm is much
more likely to be found liable. The broker-dealer is liable for all
losses caused by the misrepresentations of an agent.
Therefore,
once the fraud of the wrongdoing salesman is established, liability will
almost invariably be imposed. SEC v. First Securities Co., 2 3 a receivership proceeding, illustrates the judicial propensity to construe the
scope of agency broadly. There the president of the defendant brokerage firm induced fifteen of the firm's regular customers to invest
in a fraudulent escrow account. While no one at First Securities except
the president's secretary even knew of the escrow's existence,24 the
court cited numerous circumstances indicating that the president had
in fact acted with "apparent authority": (1) the victims had all been
regular brokerage clients of the company; (2) the investment recommendation was made to fourteen of the fifteen claimants in the president's office; (3) the claimants sold legitimate securities through First
Securities for purposes of obtaining the necessary cash to invest in the
escrow; (4) substantially all correspondence with the victims was
written on letterhead stationery of First Securities; (5) much of the
correspondence was typed by the president's secretary (although some
correspondence was handwritten); and (6) while "interest payments"
on the escrow were made by the president's personal check, the interest payments were sent in a First Securities envelope. 25 Denying that
any verbal representations by the president that he was acting on behalf of his principal were essential -to the firm's liability, the Seventh
Circuit held that the above circumstances sufficiently showed the president's apparent authority. 26 While the court did not specify which
factors it deemed most important, agency liability probably will be imposed at least whenever the plaintiffs have been regular customers of
the defendant brokerage firm, have sold stocks out of their accounts
F. Supp. 705 (D. Minn. 1968); Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 283 F. Supp. 417
(N.D. Cal. 1968), modified on other grounds, 430 F.2d 1202 (9th Cir. 1970); Hawkins
v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Beane, 85 F. Supp. 104 (W.D. Ark. 1949).
21. See notes 48-51 infra and accompanying text.
22. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCy § 257 (1958), quoted in note 16 supra.
23. 463 F.2d 981 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 880 (1972).
24. Id. at 985.
25. Id. at 983-84.
26. Id. at 986.
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to invest in the fraudulent scheme, and have been solicited by the
27
salesman in the brokerage office.

The only defense readily available to the brokerage house is that
the wrongdoer acted neither as an express nor as an apparent agent

of the firm. The tendency of courts is to construe this defense narrowly, and its applicability in a given case must be clearly demonstrated. For example, in Sennott v. Rodman & RenshaW2 8 a commodi-

ties trader brought suit against the brokerage house of Rodman & Renshaw alleging that the son of a partner in the firm had sold him non-

existent stock through the defendant's brokerage offices. While the
son was not employed by the firm, 29 he customarily approached the
plaintiff on the Chicago Board of Trade floor, advised him of favorable
investments, and called in the plaintiff's order on the Rodman phone.8 0

These facts appeared to make the salesman an agent of the firm, but
the defendant pointed out that the purchase in question was made in-

stead by secret agreement between plaintiff and the salesman"1 and
that the plaintiff had angrily refused to cooperate in a firm investigation into the activities of the son, even when shown that his checks

given in payment for the nonexistent stock had been endorsed by the

son's wife and deposited in her personal account.3 2 The Seventh Circuit, therefore, concluded that the plaintiff's purchase of the stock was

made in reliance merely on the personal integrity of the son and not
on the son's apparent authority as an agent of Rodman.3 3 Similarly,
the defendant 'brokerage firm may escape liability under an apparent
agency theory if the wrongdoing salesman's act was so obviously illegal
-that any reliance by the plaintiff on the salesman's authority would
be clearly unreasonable.8 4
27. See Lewis v. Walston & Co., 487 F.2d 617 (5th Cir. 1973); cf. Fey v. Walston
& Co., 493 F.2d 1036 (7th Cir. 1974) (brokerage firm may be held liable for salesman's
churning of account where brokerage firm shared the commissions earned).
28. 474 F.2d 32 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 926 (1973).
29. Id. at 33.
30. Id. at 34.
31. Id. at 39.
32. Id. at 36.
33. Id. at 39.
34. See Kamen & Co. v. Paul H. Aschkar & Co., 382 F.2d 689 (9th Cir. 1967),
cert. dismissed, 393 U.S. 801 (1968), where two employees of the defendant Kamen
set up a fraudulent scheme to capture the "listed business" of non-exchange member
broker-dealers for Kamen. Without the knowledge of the Kamen firm's partners, see id.
at 691-92, the scheme worked by promising over-the-counter broker-dealers that Kamen
would channel certain business in non-listed securities back to them. Broker A was
called and told to purchase a certain number of valueless shares of a certain company
from Broker B at a specific price and to sell the shares to Broker C at a slightly higher
price. Unknown to Broker A, Broker C was then told to purchase the shares from
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Under the controlling persons sections of -the securities acts, on
the other hand, the defendant broker-dealer is given two defenses.
First, just as a brokerage firm can under the common law principles
of agency contend the firm did not expressly or apparently authorize
the alleged agent's acts, the brokerage firm can, under the controlling
perons provisions, contend it did not "contror' the wrongdoing salesman. " However, the importance of this first defense should not be
overstated. It is, in fact, less helpful to a defendant brokerage house
than is the "lack of an agency" defense. The reason is that the definition of agency is much narrower than that of a control relationship."
The former is defined as a relation created by a manifestation of willingness and consent by both the agent and the principal that the agent
is to act for the principal.37 The latter, however, can exist without
a principal-agent relationship. 38 The courts have consistently held that
the "[controlling persons] statute[s] [are] remedial and [are] to be
construed liberally. .. . Only some indirect means of discipline or influence short of actual direction [is necessary] to hold a 'controlling person' liable."3 9 Moreover, one may be a controlling person without
Broker A and to sell them to Broker D at a still higher price, and so on. Id. at 692.
Aschkar, the plaintiff, was one of those induced to buy the stock, but just at that time
the scheme collapsed, and the plaintiff was left without a purchaser. Id. at 692-93.
The Ninth Circuit held that, while the salesmen were unquestionably agents of the defendant brokerage firm, they had neither actual nor "ostensible" (apparent) authority
to carry on their fraudulent activities. The court explained that "ostensible" authority
arises as a result of conduct of the principal which causes the third party reasonably
to believe that the agent possesses the authority to act on the principal's behalf. Id.
at 695. Here, however, any reliance on the agent's authority was clearly unreasonable
since Aschkar knew that guaranteed profit sales violated exchange rules. Id. at 696.
Therefore, the Kamen firm could not be held liable under agency principles. Id.
A similar defense was interposed in Hawkins v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Beane, 85 F. Supp. 104 (W.D. Ark. 1949), but the defendants were held liable as controlling persons despite the fact that they were not the wrongdoer's principal. Id. at
122-24.
35. This defense was also successfully raised by the Rodman & Renshaw firm in
Sennott. The court explained that the activity in question was so remote and unrelated
to Rodman that the brokerage firm could not possibly be deemed to be in control of
the wrongdoer. 474 F.2d at 39-40.
36. It should be noted that section 15 of the 1933 Act specifically enumerates
agency as only one of several suggested means of control. See note 19 supra.
37. Ruder 605. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 15 (1958).
38. Harriman v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
94,399, at 95,365 (D. Del. Jan 16, 1974); Moscarelli v. Stamm, 288 F. Supp. 453, 460
n.5 (E.D.N.Y. 1968); Hawkins v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Beane, 85 F. Supp.
104, 123 (W.D. Ark. 1949).
39. Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 738 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951
(1968); accord, Harriman v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
f 94,399, at 95,366 (D. Del. Jan. 16, 1974); Jezarian v. Csapo, [1972-1973 Transfer
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having in fact exercised control.40
The second defense-and the one which makes liability under
the controlling persons sections more difficult to establish than under
transplanted agency principles-is provided by the express statutory
language. Section 20(a) imposes liability "unless the controlling person acted in good faith and did not directly or indirectly induce the
act or acts constituting the violation or cause of action. ' 41 Section 15
results in liability "unless the controlling person had no knowledge of
or reasonable ground to believe in the existence of the facts by reason
42
of which the liability of the controlled person is alleged to exist.
These defenses, although by no means an absolute bar to recovery,4 a
are at least formidable enough to encourage plaintiffs to place foremost reliance on agency principles in a cause of action for a federal
securities violation. Only in the absence of an employment relationship between salesman and broker-dealer, where an agency relationship might be difficult to establish, would the investor 'by choice rely
upon the controlling persons sections. 44
AmE THE CONTROLLING PERSONS SECTIONS ExcLuSivE?

One of the most unsettled questions in securities law is whether
or not the controlling persons sections are exclusive in a federal cause
of action, thus preventing imposition of the strict liability flowing from
Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. %93,795, at 93,439 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Anderson v.
Francis I. duPont & Co., 291 F. Supp. 705, 710 (D. Minn. 1968).
40. Harriman v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., CCH FED. Smc. L. REP.
94,399, at 95,366 (D.Del. Jan. 16, 1974).
41. 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (1970).
42. 15 U.S.C. § 77o (1970).
43. See, e.g., Lorenz v. Watson, 258 F. Supp. 724 (E.D. Pa. 1966); Hawkins v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Beane, 85 F. Supp. 104 (W.D. Ark. 1949). See generally Comment, Brokerage Firm's Liability for Salesman's Fraudulent Practices, 36
FOEDHAM

L. REv. 95, 98-101 (1967).

44. For cases where an investor attempted to hold a brokerage firm liable for the
acts of a salesman not actually employed by the brokerage firm, see Sennott v. Rodman
& Renshaw, 474 F.2d 32 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 926 (1973); Anderson v.
Francis L duPont & Co., 291 F. Supp. 705 (D. Minn. 1968); Hawkins v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Beane, 85 F. Supp. 104 (W.D. Ark. 1949).
For another situation where it would be difficult to rely on an agency theory of
liability, see Hughes v. Dempsey-Tegeler & Co., [1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. Sac.
L. REP.
94,133, at 94,524-54 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 4, 1973) (suit by investor against
stock exchange for fraudulent acts committed by brokerage house and agents thereof).
While no agency theory of liability was proposed in Hughes, the court did hold that
the exchange was a "controlling person." Id. at 94,551. However, the exchange was
held to have satisfied the good faith defense and thus was not held liable. Id. at
94,552. See also DeMarco v. Edens, 390 F.2d 836, 844 (2d Cir. 1968) (no agency
relation exists between issuer and underwriter).
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general agency principles. 45 The District Court -for the Southern Dis-

trict of New York has twice upheld exclusivity. 46 At least five other
courts have applied agency principles instead of the relevant control-

47
ling persons section, thus stripping the firm of its statutory defenses.

Some courts have considered both theories, although most such cases
have held the defendant brokerage house inculpable under both. 48
No case appears to have arisen where the "good faith" defense was sat-

isfied but the strict liability of the agency relationship was nevertheless imposed. Thus, the courts' consideration of agency principles,
which provide far less readily available defenses than the controlling

persons statutes, has not yet been detrimental to defendants. However,
in Hawkins v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Beane,49 another case

considering both agency and controlling persons liability, the reverse
happened. The wrongdoing salesman, although not an agent of the
defendant Merrill Lynch, was found to be "controlled by" the broker-

age firm."

Since the court held Merrill Lynch had not satisfied the

"good faith" defense, liability was imposed under section 20(a).5 1

The legislative history of sections 15 and 20(a) does not definitively answer the question of whether, in an action brought under

the securities acts, these sections preclude imposing strict liability on
a brokerage firm merely on a showing that it is the principal. There
is some indication, based on differences between the House and Sen-

ate drafts of the 1933 Act, that section 15 was not initially intended
to govern the brokerage employee situation.

The original Senate ver-

sion merely contained several "dummy" director provisions designed
to prevent directors from evading the liabilities incident to signing a
registration statement by having "dummies" sign in their place. 52 The
45. For a general discussion of the construction of statutes in derogation of the
common law, see 2A J. SUTHERLAND, STATuras AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 50.05
(Sand 4th ed. 1973).
46. See Gordon v. Burr, 366 F. Supp. 156 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); SEC v. Lum's, Inc.,
365 F. Supp. 1046 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
47. See Fey v. Walston & Co., 493 F.2d 1036 (7th Cir. 1974); Lewis v. Walston
& Co., 487 F.2d 617 (5th Cir. 1973); Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Hutton, 422 F.2d 1124
(4th Cir. 1970), afl'g in part and rev'g in part 297 F. Supp. 1165 (D. Md. 1968); Armstrong, Jones & Co. v. SEC, 421 F.2d 359 (6th Cir. 1970); SEC v. Charles A. Morris
& Associates, Inc., [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. f 93,756
(W.D. Tenn. 1973).
48. See, e.g., Sennott v. Rodman & Renshaw, 474 F.2d 32 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 926 (1973); Kamen & Co. v. Paul H. Aschkar & Co., 382 F.2d 689 (9th
Cir. 1967), cert. dismissed, 393 U.S. 801 (1968).
49. 85 F. Supp. 104 (W.D. Ark. 1949).
50. Id. at 123.
51. Id.
52. S. REP. No. 47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 5-6 (1933); see S. 875, 73d Cong., 1st
Sess. §§ 2(k), 4, 9, 13 (1933), reprintedin 77 CONG. Ruc. 2979-82 (1933).
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House version, while imposing liability on directors for false registration statements, did not contain either a "dummy" provision or a controlling persons provision.5" In conference, the Senate provision became the present section 15 of the 1933 Act.54 Thus, arguably section 15 was merely the result of congressional concern with the special
problems presented by the use of dummy directors and was not designed to cover the salesman-brokerage firm relationship.
This justification for a standard of strict liability flowing from the
agency relationship is insufficient for two reasons. First, it fails to
explain why section 15 is written in much more general terms than
the original Senate provision. A House report describing the amendment to section 15, which added the scienter test for controlling persons liability, is written in equally broad terms. 55 The report contains
no hint that section 15, clear on its face, is limited in its application.
Second, even assuming that section 15 was not meant to apply to employment relationships, there is no similar legislative history mandating
such a limitation on section 20(a) of the 1934 Act.5" On the contrary, the legislative history indicates that Congress intended a very
broad definition of control:
In this section . . . when reference is made to "control," the term is
intended to include actual control as well as what has been called
legally enforceable control . . . . It would be difficult if not impossible to enumerate or to anticipate the many ways in which actual control may be exerted. A few examples of the methods used are stock
ownership, lease, contract, and agency .... 57
The most lucid federal securities act decision applying agency
principles rather than the appropriate controlling persons section
(thereby avoiding the firm's possible statutory defenses) is Johns Hopkins University v. Hutton.5 8 Johns Hopkins brought suit against W.E.
53. H.R. REP. No. 152, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 27 (1933).

54. See id.
55. See H.R. REP. No. 1838, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 42 (1934).

The amendment to

section 15 added the words "unless the controlling person had no knowledge of or rea-

sonable ground to believe in the existence of the facts by reason of which the liability
of the controlled person is alleged to exist." Id. at 49.
56. Because of the sweeping scope of Rule lob-5 most suits against brokerage firms
come under the 1934 Act. See note 83 infra and accompanying text.
57. H.R. RaP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 26 (1934) (emphasis added).
58. 297 F. Supp. 1165 (D. Md. 1968), ajfd in part and rev'd in part, 422 F.2d
124 (4th Cir. 1970). The holding in Johns Hopkins has been followed by the Seventh
Circuit in Fey v. Walston & Co., Inc., 493 F.2d 1036 (7th Cir. 1974). Interestingly,
the other three courts which have applied agency principles instead of the controlling
persons sections in suits against brokerage houses for their salesmen's misconduct, see
cases cited in note 47 supra, have not even considered the possible applicability of the
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Hutton & Co., a brokerage firm, to rescind the University's purchase
of an oil and gas production payment on the ground that a Hutton
employee had falsely predicted future net revenues for the oil wells.
The district court held that the controlling persons liability of section
15 merely supplements common law principles of agency and respondeat superior.5 9
The legislative history and case law, to the extent -there is any, would
appear to buttress a contruction of section 15 to exclude application
of -the latter -to an employment relationship. A contrary conclusion
would in effect give blessing to a hear-no-evil, see-no-evil approach
by partners of a brokerage house which is hardly in keeping with the
remedial purposes of the '33 Act .... 60
If Hutton escaped liability because its partners had no knowledge of

or reasonable grounds to believe in the employee's misrepresentations,
the court speculated, then the partners in a brokerage house could
insulate themselves from liability under the federal securities acts by

simply ignoring employee sales practices. 6 ' Although the Fourth Circuit agreed with the reasoning of the district court,62 the fear that
brokerage houses would frequently escape section 15 liability when
they would have been held culpable under a strict liability standard
is probably not justified. The words "reasonable grounds to believe"
should be construed to impose liability where the employer should
have known of the salesman's fradulent conduct or the likelihood
thereof.6 3 Furthermore, under the 1934 Act, the intentional disregard
controlling persons provisions.
Besides this judicial support for the contention that the controlling persons provisions do not supplant agency liability, two commentators, Professors Bromberg and Ruder, also agree with the non-exclusivity view. See 1 BROMBERG § 6.1(100), at 107
n.11; Ruder 608. Not surprisingly, the SEC has taken a similar position. See Briefs
for SEC as Amicus Curiae, Kamen & Co. v. Paul H. Aschkar & Co., 390 U.S. 942
(1968), cited in Ruder 606-07. The Supreme Court, however, never decided the issue
in Kamen, as certiorari was later dismissed by agreement between the parties. 393
U.S. 801 (1968). The SEC unsuccessfully advanced the same argument in SEC v.
Lum's, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 1046 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). There is some indication that at
least two members of the Supreme Court would find a brokerage firm liable on agency
principles. See Sennott v. Rodman & Renshaw, 414 U.S. 926 (Douglas & Blackmun,
J.J., dissenting), denying cert. to 474 F.2d 32 (7th Cir. 1973).
59. 297 F. Supp. at 1212.
60. Id.
61. See id at 1212-13.
62. 422 F.2d 1124, 1128, 1131 (4th Cir. 1970).
63. See DeMarco v. Edens, 390 F.2d 836 (2d Cir. 1968). This was a suit against
the issuing corporation for the fraudulent conduct of its underwriter. The court, although exculpating the defendant from liability under section 15, inquired not only into
the defendant's actual knowledge of the fraud but also into the issuer's exercise of reasonable care in investigating the underwriter. Id. at 842-43.
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of employee sales practices would certainly be evidence of blatant bad
faith.
An additional argument against the exclusivity of the controlling
persons sections can be based on the language of section 28(a) of
the 1934 Act: "The rights and remedies provided by this chapter
shall be in addition to any and all other rights and remedies that may
exist at law or in equity . . ."3 This argument appears to be the
basis for the Seventh Circuit's recent holding in Fey v. Walston & Co. 5
that section 20(a) does not exclude federal securities liability predicated upon agency principles. While the court did not expressly cite
section 28(a), the Seventh Circuit stated that "the mere existence of
remedial provisions in the Securities Acts does not foreclose the application of similar common law remedies."6 An analogy can also be
drawn to a line of cases holding that remedies under the federal
securities acts are cumulative, not mutually exclusive, and that therefore an implied cause of action exists under rule 10b-5 despite the
availability of another remedy under an express civil liability section.07
However, such an importation of agency principles into the federal securities laws will often render the controlling persons sections
superfluous in a context to which they clearly apply: the control re64. 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1970) (emphasis added). Parallel language is found in
section 16 of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77p (1970).
65. 493 F.2d 1036 (7th Cir. 1974). In Fey the plaintiff, a widow, alleged that her
account had been churned and brought suit under rule 10b-5. The trial court rendered
judgment for the plaintiff in the sum of $18,227.04. On appeal the defendant brokerage
firm complained that the court failed adequately to instruct the jury as to the statutory
defense provided by section 20(a). The Seventh Circuit held that even if the charge
were erroneous, the defendant could not complain since the firm could be held liable
for its employee's 10b-5 violation under respondeat superior and therefore had obtained
a more favorable instruction than it was entitled to. Id. at 1052. The case, however,
was reversed and remanded because other charges were found to be erroneous.
66. Id. at 1052 n.18. The court went on to state that the converse was also true:
a statutory remedy may be invoked even though the proof is insufficient to sustain a
corresponding common law remedy. Id. As further authority for its holding the court
cited Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972), in which a defendant bank was held "coextensively" liable for the 10b-5 violation of its officer-employees. The Court, however, did not give any reasons for its holding. Whatever theory
the Court had in mind, the case is clearly distinguishable from suits against brokerage
houses for their salesmen's acts. A corporation is always liable for the fraudulent acts
of its officers-as distinguished from lower level employees-since the acts of the officers are imputed to the corporation. See SEC v. Lum's, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 1046, 1061
(S.D.N.Y. 1973).
67. See, e.g., Jordan Bldg. Corp. v. Doyle, O'Connor & Co., 401 F.2d 47 (7th Cir.
1968); Orn v. Eastman Dillon, [1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SFc. L. REP. f
94,189 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 2, 1973); Stewart v. Bennett [1973 Transfer Binder] CCH
FED. Sac. L. R P. 194,140 (D. Mass. 1973); Rotstein v. Reynolds & Co., 359 F. Supp.
109 (N.D. Ill. 1973).
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lationship of a broker-dealer and its employees.0
While section
28(a) does provide that the rights and remedies under the 1934 Act
are in addition to those granted by common law, this section was
merely meant to preserve actions for common law fraud or deceit.6 9
A plaintiff should not, in the interest of fairness, be permitted to sue
under one of the broad federal antifraud provisions and, at the same
time, hold the defendant broker-dealer absolutely liable in derogation
of the defenses provided as part of the same statutory scheme. When
the cause of action is based upon the federal securities laws, the liability of the defendant brokerage firm should be determined under the
appropriate controlling persons section. On the other 'hand, if a plaintiff
further alleges common law fraud or deceit by the salesman, then the
liability of the broker-dealer for that additional count should be determined under common law agency principles.70 Of course, under the
appropriate facts a defendant can be held liable under both theories,-*
but the two causes of action allow the broker different defenses, and
the two standards of liability should not be confused. This argument
was suggested in Moscarelli v. Stamm 2 where the court, by way of
dictum, stated that "[w]hich provision is applicable may depend upon
tort under
whether the cause of action is predicated upon a statutory
73
-tort.
law
common
a
upon
or
laws
securities
the federal
The foregoing section has considered and rejected the various
arguments for coexistence, within a federal securities act cause of action, of agency and controlling persons liability. Finally, it must be
emphasized that the strongest argument for the exclusivity of the
standard of liability of the controlling persons sections arises from the
statutory language itself. This contention has received judicial recognition only recently in SEC v. Lum's, Inc.,74 an enforcement proceeding under rule lOb-5 against Lehman Brothers and a registered representative for "tipping" a major institutional client regarding an expected earnings decline in Lum's stock.78 In holding that liability
68. See Comment, supra note 43, at 97. For those limited situations in which the
controlling persons sections would not be superfluous, see cases cited in note 44 supra.
69. See 1 L. Loss, Scuarr.ms REGUrATION 156 (2d ed. 1961).
70. See Moscarelli v. Stamm, 288 F. Supp. 453, 460-61 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
71. For an example where this was done, see SEC v. First Sec. Co., 463 F.2d 981
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 880 (1972).
72. 288 F. Supp. 453 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
73. Id. at 460 n.6.
74. 365 F. Supp. 1046 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). The holding in Lum's has been followed
in Gordon v. Burr, 366 F. Supp. 156 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
75. According to the complaint, d director and chief operating officer of Lum's (a
franchisor of fast-food restaurants and owner of Caesar's Palace in Las Vegas) received
a non-public, pessimistic earnings projection which he relayed to a registered represent-
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could not be imposed on Lehman Brothers without regard to any possible lack of "fault," the court carefully examined the language of the
controlling persons sections. On their face, the court noted, the sections would seem to cover the employer-employee situation,7" since
section 20(a) applies to "[e]very person, who, directly or indirectly,
controls any person liable under any provision of this chapter or of
any rule or regulation thereunder,"7 7 and section 15 applies to "[e]very
person who, by or through stock ownership, agency or otherwise
controls any person liable under sections 77k or 771 . . .. ,
Since
section 15 specifically defines "control" in terms of agency, 79 and since
a House report indicates a similar construction of section 20(a),80 the
controlling persons provisions squarely exclude the application of strict
liability based on common law agency principles in federal securities
acts cases."'
ative at Lehman Brothers. The representative then conveyed the information to Investors Diversified Service, Inc., which quickly thereafter dumped its 83,000 shares of
Lum's. See 365 F. Supp. at 1050.
76. Id.at 1063.
77. Id.(emphasis added by the court).
78. Id. (emphasis added by the court).
79. See note 19 supra.
80. See note 57 supra and accompanying text.
81. The couxt in Lum's, seeking further justification for exclusivity, interpreted the
landmark case of Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1973) as implying
that section 20(a) sets the correct standard of liability for broker-dealers. In Lanza
a partner in the brokerage firm of Drexel & Co. was a director of BarChris Construetion Co. In an acquisition negotiation certain other directors and officers of BarChris
made fraudulent misrepresentations to the holders of Victor Billiard stock. Since the
Drexel partner was unaware of the misrepresentations, he was not held liable under
rule lOb-5. Id. at 1289. Consequently, the court did not actually reach the question
of whether Drexel had liability either under respondeat superior (as the plaintiff alleged, id. at 1280) or under the controlling persons sections (as Mr. Justice Hays argued in his dissenting opinion, id. at 1319-20).
Nevertheless, the court in Lum's read Lanza as authority for imposing liability on
Lehman Brothers under section 20(a) for the acts of the employee-salesman. 365 F.
Supp. at 1063. Despite this construction, the court declined to apply Lanza or the controlling persons sections to Lum's itself. Rather, since the court could not conceive
of a corporation acting in any other way than through its officers and directors, Lum's
was held liable under agency principles for the act of its "tipping" director. Id. at
1061. The court admitted, however, that the result would be the same under section
20(a). Id.
Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 283 F. Supp. 417 (N.D. Cal. 1968), modified on
other grounds, 430 F.2d 689 (9th Cir. 1970), another case cited in Lum's as supporting
exclusivity, is a more questionable authority, since the exact holding in Hecht is unclear. While the court noted that Harris Upham had failed to comply with the requirements for internal supervision as provided in section 20(a), the court at another point
stated, "A stock brokerage firm can act only through its various partners and employees
and agents, and [their acts] . . . are the acts of the firm." 283 F. Supp. at 443.
Thus, the court may actually have found both agency principles and section 20(a) ap-
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THE GOOD FAITH DEFENSE

Once it is accepted that the controlling persons sections are the
appropriate standard for determining the liability of a brokerage firm
for the federal securities violations of its salesmen, the final issue for
determination is the breadth of the broker-dealer's statutory defenses.
It has been suggested that
the 1934 Act gives the controlling person a seemingly readier defense
than the 1933 Act. Under section 20(a) of the 1934 Act the controlling person need prove only that he "acted in good faith and did not
directly or indirectly induce the act or acts constituting the violation
or cause of action," whereas under section 15 of the 1933 Act the controlling person must prove that he "had no knowledge of or reasonable grounds to believe in the existence of the facts by reason of which
'8 2
the liability of the controlled person is alleged to exist."
However, because of the broad scope of rule 10b-5, most suits by investors against broker-dealers and their employees fall under the 1934
Act8 3 despite the greater difficulty in overcoming defenses, and therefore few cases have construed the controlling persons section of the
1933 Act. The best construction, however, appears to be that, in
order to escape liability under section 15, controlling persons must exercise the "reasonable care" of a "person of ordinary prudence" to
ascertain violations of the federal securities acts.84 This construction
implies some burden of investigation into the conduct of the controlled
person, and, if reasonable care is given its common law meaning, then
a brokerage firm which is merely negligent in its supervision of salesmen may nonetheless be held liable.8 5
The nature of the "good faith" defense provided by the 1934 Act
has been far more frequently litigated, and the courts have achieved
varying results. The leading case construing section 20(a) is Lorenz
plicable. This would be consistent with the Ninth Circuit's earlier holding in Kamen &
Co. v. Paul H. Aschkar & Co., 382 F.2d 689 (9th Cir. 1967), cert. dismissed, 393 U.S.
801 (1968). The court in Lum's read Kamen as holding that the "controlling persons"
sections provide the exclusive basis of broker-dealer liability, 365 F. Supp. at 1062-63,
but this appears to be an erroneous reading of the case, see note 34 supra.
82. 3 L. Loss, SucuamTiEs REGULATION 1747 (2d ed. 1961) (citation omitted).
83. See 1 BROMBERG § 2.5(6), reporting that "10b-5 is generating almost as much
litigation as all the other general antifraud provisions together, and several times as

much as the express liabilities."
84. See DeMarco v. Edens, 390 F.2d 836, 842-43 (2d Cir. 1968).
85. See Folk, Civil Liabilities Under the Federal Securities Acts: The BarChris
Case, Part II-The Broader Implications, 55 VA. L. REv. 199, 216-24 (1969) (suggesting that controlling persons under section 15 must exercise "a reasonable degree of attention to the conduct of those whose actions presumably benefit them," id. at 224,
a burden somewhat akin to that imposed under section 12(2) of the 1933 Act).
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v. Watson,"6 an action brought by an elderly couple who alleged churning of their account at Bioren & Co.8 In denying summary judgment
for the defendant brokerage house, the court held that in order to
satisfy the requirement of good faith, the defendants had to show that

some precautionary measures were taken and enforced to prevent the
injury suffered.

8

Thus, the good faith defense has come to resemble

the requirement of proper supervision imposed by NYSE Rule 405,11
section 27 of the NASD Rules of Fair Practice,9" and by the 1934
Act itselfY1 As stated in SEC v. Lum's, Inc.:
Whether this alleged failure to supervise vitiates the "good faith" defense provided under § 20(a), . . . or whether it constitutes sufficiently negligent conduct to render Lehman directly liable as a participant
according to the SEC, doubtless are two different ways of phrasing the
92
same question.

Recent decisions employing an adequate supervision standard have imposed a high burden of supervision on brokerage firms and have thus
construed the good faith defense narrowly. In SEC v. First Securitiev
Co.,93 the president of the defendant brokerage firm persuaded fif-

teen customers to invest in a nonexistent escrow fund; 94 the scheme
was facilitated by a rule of the brokerage house that mail addressed

to the president's attention was not to be opened by anyone else.95
Holding that this rule constituted a breach of the duty of adequate
supervision, the court thereby denied the employer's good faith de-

fense and rendered the brokerage firm liable as a controlling person
86. 258 F. Supp. 724 (E.D. Pa. 1966).
87. Churning is the overtrading of an account in order to generate commissions.
See 3 L. Loss, SEcnuRTIEs REGULTION 1479-80 (2d ed. 1961).
88. See 258 F. Supp. at 732; accord, SEC v. First Sec. Co., 463 F.2d 981, 987
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 880 (1972); Gordon v. Burr, 366 F. Supp. 156
(S.D.N.Y. 1973); Hughes v. Dempsey-Tegeler & Co., [1973 Transfer Binder] CCH
FED. SEC. L. REP. i 94,133, at 94,550 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 4, 1973); Hecht v. Harris,
Upham & Co., 283 F. Supp. 417, 438 (N.D. Cal. 1968), modified on other grounds,
430 F.2d 1202 (9th Cir. 1970).
89. See note 8 supra.
90. See note 9 s'upra.
91. See section 15(b)(5)(E) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(5)(E) (1970);
rule 15b10-4, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15b10 (1973).
92. 365 F. Supp. 1046 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); cf. Gordon v. Burr, 366 F. Supp. 156
(S.D.N.Y. 1973) (defendant brokerage firm failed to call any witnesses at trial to testify with regard to a system of adequate supervision and was therefore found not to
have satisfied the good faith requirement).
93. 463 F.2d 981 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 880 (1972). See text accompanying notes 23-27 supra.
94. Id. at 983-84.
95. Id. at 985, 987.
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under section 20(a).96 The strictness of the requisite supervision is
readily apparent if even the daily activities of the firm president must
come within the scrutiny of a watchdog system of checks and balances.
In Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 7 a brokerage firm was held liable
for its salesman's churning of an account where, in contravention of
the firm's own rules requiring special treatment for female customers'
commodities accounts, Ms. Hecht's account was opened and her portfolio traded with only the informal approval of a partner. 98 The defendant brokerage house had also failed to make any subsequent investigation or check of the account, even though the record showed that
it was among the most actively traded and had in fact generated more
than half of the salesman's commissions.9 9 It is unclear from the court's
opinion whether the mere failure to give special treatment to a woman's account constitutes lack of diligent supervision. Such a holding,
resting on the assumption that female traders are less knowledgeable
than their male counterparts, would seem peculiarly unenlightened.
Since the court was also careful to note that the plaintiff was a widow,
retired, and depended on the account for her income, 100 the better
conclusion to be drawn is that a brokerage firm -must make a reasonable and continuing inquiry into the financial circumstances, trading
experience, and investment objectives of each customer-especially
those whose accounts are among the firm's most actively traded.
On the other hand, in Lum's, where a salesman violated rule 10b5 by leaking inside information, the court found the defendant brokerage firm had satisfied the defense of good faith by pointing to a system
of adequate and reasonable supervision. 1' 0 Lehman Brothers maintained a "compliance department" staffed by competent attorneys who
periodically met with the salesmen. 02 Memoranda apprising salesmen of current developments in securities law were regularly circulated. 10 3 A book of guidelines and a video tape concerning rule lOb5 problems were distributed to all branch offices.' 04 The court also
96. Id. at 987. For an SEC decision also holding that proper supervision requires
inspection of every employee's incoming mail, see Kamen & Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7965 (Sept. 29, 1966), reprintedin 1966-1967 Transfer Binder]
CCH FED. SEC. L. RP. M77,408.
97. 283 F. Supp. 417 (N.D. Cal. 1968), modified on other grounds, 430 F.2d 1202
(9th Cir. 1970).
98. Id. at 438-39.
99. Id. at 436, 439.
100. Id. at 439.
101. 365F. Supp. at 1064-65'
102. Id. at 1064.
103. Id.

104. Id.
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noted that the guilty salesman was a respected and trusted employee,
on whose judgment Lehman could reasonably rely. 0 5 While Lehman

did not at that time have a rule prohibiting salesmen from contacting
the management of corporations whose securities were held by clients,
the court did not feel the absence of such a rule negated the good
10 6
faith defense.
The "objectification" of the good faith defense has conveniently
served to make the defense manageable. While good faith is tradi-

tionally measured by the defendant's intent, purpose, or motive rather
than by his due diligence or care, 10 7 it is much easier to screen the

adequacy of a 'broker-dealer's supervisory procedures than it is to
probe the corporate mind of Merrill Lynch.

But in loosely equating

good faith with non-negligent supervision, the courts are suggesting
an erroneous standard. Certainly, stringent supervisory procedures
are important evidence of an employer's good faith.

Bad faith, how-

ever, is not the same as mere negligence, but rather requires a showing of scienter or conduct which is intentional or reckless in nature.109
Just as negligent conduct is probably not sufficient to establish liability
in a private damage action under rule 10b-5,

00

a negligent failure

to supervise should not justify the imposition of liability on a brokerage
firm for the acts of its employee when the firm is sued by a private
investor.

The standard should be different from that applied under

the NYSE or NASD "diligent supervison" rules or in an administrative proceeding by -the SEC.

In Kamen & Co. v. Paul H. Aschkar

& Co.," 0 the Ninth Circuit did impliedly make this distinction, finding

105. Id. at 1065.
106. The court seemed to be impressed by the fact that no other broker-dealers had
"focused" on the problem of employee contacts with management. Id. But see Paine,
Webber, Jackson & Curtis, SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8500 (Jan. 12,
1969), reprinted in [1967-1969 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP.
77,650,
rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Klopp v. SEC, 427 F.2d 455 (6th Cir. 1970) (the
fact that supervisory procedures are equal to or better than those of other firms of comparable size is not an excuse); F.S. Johns & Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release
No. 7972 (Oct. 10, 1966), reprinted in [1966-1967 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC.
L. REP. 177,410, affd sub nom. Winkler v. SEC, 377 F.2d 517 (2d Cir. 1967) and
Dlugash v. SEC, 373 F.2d 107 (2d Cir. 1967) (although others may be deficient in
providing adequate supervision, that fact cannot excuse the defendant).
107. See 2 BROMBERG § 8.4(504).
108. See Gould v. American Hawaiian S.S. Co., 351 F. Supp. 853, 860 n.7 (D. Del.
1972). The difference between the scienter requirement in a 10b-5 action and the
good faith defense under section 20(a) is merely a shift in the burden of proof from
the plaintiff to the defendant. See id. at 858 n.4. See also Gordon v. Burr, 366 F.
Supp. 156, 168 n.l1 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
109. See Bucklo, Scienter and Rule 10b-5, 67 Nw. U.L. REv. 562-63 (1972).
110. 382 F.2d 689 (9th Cir. 1967), cert. dismissed, 393 U.S. 801 (1968).
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no bad faith by the defendant broker-dealer in its selection and supervision of employees' 1 ' even though, on .the same set of facts, the SEC
had temporarily suspended -the defendant from the national securities
exchanges and the NASD on the ground there was negligence under
the standards of the diligent supervision rules." 2 But other courts,
carelessly speaking in terms of negligence rather than of a reckless
or willful failure to supervise employees, could easily, in a laudable
attempt to objectify the good faith standard, oversimplify the defense
to the point where even slight negligence nullifies the broker-dealer's
good faith." 3
CONCLUSION

Two different theories of broker-dealer liability for the federal
securities violations of salesmen have been discussed herein: "respondeat superior" or agency liability, and liability under the controlling
persons sections of the securities acts. Once the existence of an
agency relationship has been established, the employer's liability is absolute. Since most suits involve misrepresentations by employee-salesmen clearly acting within the scope of their employment, the "lack
of an agency" defense is relatively unimportant. The controlling persons sections, however, while ensnaring more than merely the agents
of the brokerage firm, provide the broker-dealer with valuable statutory defenses. Therefore, injured investors will generally prefer to
utilize an agency theory of liability.
Several courts have allowed respondeat superior as a method of
imposing secondary liability on brokerage firms for their salesmen's
violations of the federal securities acts. However, the better reasoning appears to be that the controlling persons provisions of these acts
have excluded agency liability for such violations. As a matter of
policy, if a plaintiff has elected to sue for violation of one of the federal antifraud provisions, he should not then be able to impose absolute
liability on the brokerage firm in blind disregard of the broker's defenses allowed under the controlling persons sections. Moreover, -the
111. Id. at 697.
112. See Kamen & Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7965 (Sept. 29,
1966), reprintedin [1966-1967 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. f 77,408.
113. Under this standard, the reasoning in First Securities should not be followed,
since a brokerage firm which merely omits to inspect its president's mail can hardly
be deemed to be acting in bad faith. On the other hand, Hecht was probably correctly decided even under a bad faith standard in view of the fact the wrongdoing
salesman was earning half of his commissions from the plaintiffs account and no investigation of the account was ever undertaken.
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controlling persons provisions, defining "contror' specifically in terms
of agency, would, on their face, seem to exclude liability based on
common law agency principles.
Given the exclusivity of the controlling persons provisions in federal securities suits, the most important remaining issue is the nature
of the statutory defenses. Although negligence is probably sufficient
misconduct to justify liability under the Securities Act, a broker-dealer
should not be held liable under the 1934 Act if it sustains the burden
of good faith by showing it was not reckless in the supervision of
employees. While many courts appear to impose a higher burden,
requiring the broker-dealer to show no negligence in its supervisory
procedures, such a construction is an unwarranted interpretation of the
good faith defense. The courts' understandable concern that a subjective standard might be difficult to apply should not be permitted to
obscure the clear statutory language.

